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ABSTRACT

Attention is drawn to the programs funded under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, defining this law as a basic attempt to change the interrelationships of social groups in America. This paper presents as a case study the relationships between a community action agency (CAA), on the one hand, and the local school districts (LEAs) and state education department (SEA), on the other, in Nawwau County, New York, during 1968-1970. The dichotomy illustrates how two kinds of agencies interact with each other--expanding, contracting, and resolving jurisdictional disputes. Several theoretical orientations which aid in the explanation and interpretation of the circumstances, activities, and perspectives associated with the relationships that developed between the CAA and the educational authorities are presented. (SHM)

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THE COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY AND EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS

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THE COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY AND EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS

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The imminent demise of the programs funded under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 draws fresh attention to these laws as basic attempts to change the interrelationships of social groups in America. Although their days seem to be numbered, the programs that grew from these acts should not be forgotten, for buried in the thrusts and counterthrusts of the political activity that occurred lie the bases for important understandings of public issues joined with organizational problems: concerns that will most certainly loom large again.

This paper presents as a case study, the relationships between a community action agency (CAA), on the one hand, and the local school districts (LEAs) and state education department (SEA), on the other.[1] in Nassau County, New York during 1968-1970. During this period new styles of action were initiated, new publics became legitimated, and perceptions of their tasks changed for many educators, community leaders, and community workers. Further, new organizational relationships were invented and tried out and strategies for both effecting change and coping change were undertaken.

The plan here is to use several theoretical orientations which will aid in the explanation and interpretation of the circumstances, activities, and perspectives associated with the relation-

1. "LEA" is derived from the generic term, "Local Educational Agency" and "SEA" is derived from the term, "State Educational Agency." This nomenclature is common in the literature on federal programs.

ships that developed between the CAA and the educational authorities. Drawing upon Gamson's (1968) important book, Power and Discontent, use is made of his division between potential partisans, those who seek to influence the authorities, and the authorities, those whose decisions and actions are binding on others. Associated with this division are the ideas of an influence perspective on the part of the potential partisans and a social control perspective on the part of the authorities. Here, the authors view the CAA as potential partisans seeking to influence the education authorities (the LEAs and SEA), whose decisions on educational matters, flowing from their established and legitimate powers in that realm, normally had been considered binding on those affected by them.

The division is helpful in that it allows us to deal with a question of the relationships between the two groups in an important aspect, namely, trust. As Gamson explains, the level of trust that potential partisans (here the CAA) have toward authorities (LEA & SEA) tends to be indicative of what kind of behavior the two groups extend toward each other. Thus, both parties may act quite differently in circumstances where there is a high level of trust, as opposed to a low level of trust.

We can, in fact, follow the progress of the level of trust (from confidence to neutrality to alienation) which CAA's had in their relationships with LEA and SEA in four stages, and see what kinds of behavior were exhibited by both. Thus, with confidence goes persuasion as a usual means of influencing the authorities, with neutrality goes bargaining, negotiations, compromise, and inducements, and with alienation, goes constraints.

From the perspective of the authorities (in this case the LEAs and SEA) the means of social control exercised in response to levels of trust included persuasion in relation to confidence

of the potential partisans, sanctions and inducements in relation to neutrality of influence groups, and insulation in relation to alienation among potential partisans (see Gamson, 1968, pp.178-183).

Joined with this primary organizing set of concepts and helpful in interpreting the meaning of certain inter-organizational activities is an analysis of the differing styles of politics which the two sets of organizations used as they attempted to organize their political environments in ways favorable to themselves (Figure 1). Here, it is possible to use a classification scheme developed by Bloland (1971) for a study of big city school boards decisionmaking. The styles of politics include expertise politics (politics of professionals), pluralist politics, and status politics. This last concept was developed primarily from Gusfield (1963).

The politics of expertise involves the process of attempting to gain and hold control over decision-making processes through convincing others that one ought to have decision-making power because of superior expert knowledge and a strong commitment to the clients' and the public welfare. It connects with the Gamson scheme in that the politics of expertise requires a high level of confidence to be effective for authorities in their relationship to potential partisans.

Pluralist politics is the politics of interest groups. The assumption here is that there are not enough resources to go around and that conflicts constantly arise among groups as they compete for material and other resources. It is related to Gamson's neutrality level of trust in that exchange relationships predominate among competing groups and the typical modes of actions include bargaining, competing groups and the typical modes of actions

Trust Dimension	Political Means	Political Styles
Confidence	Explanation Advice	Politics of Expertise or Professional Politics
Neutrality	Bargaining Inducements Compromise	Pluralist or Class Politics
Alienation	Constraints (by partisans) Insulation (by authorities)	Status Politics

Fig. 1: The trust dimension and political styles. (Adapted from Bicland, 1971).

include bargaining, compromising, and offering and accepting inducements from each other.

Status politics involves attempting to enhance or defend a group's prestige position in relation to other groups, and to do it usually through political and social institutions, e.g., schools. Claims for status groups are made, not on the basis of expertise, or material bargaining resources, but on the basis of a clear belief in the truth and justice of one's position. Claims are presented as morally correct and not subject to bargaining, compromising or modification. They represent a quest to obtain symbolic expressions of respect and deference in institutions. Status political orientations are related to Gamson's concepts regarding trust, in that potential partisans engaging in status politics, invariably do so from a highly alienated perspective. The activities of the alienated engaging in status politics include attempts to employ direct confrontation as well as a variety of constraints against authorities, while authorities tend to respond by insulating themselves as much as possible.

Finally, Holden's (1966) concept of "bureaucratic imperialism" is used to account for some aspects of agency interaction. Holden views high-level agency administrators as being "administrative politicians", faced with the crucial problem of nurturing their organizations' power vis-a-vis other agencies competing for resources and clients in an environment of ambiguous jurisdictions. He holds that, because "the condition of power is a favorable balance of constituencies, ... the administrative politician tends to adopt the impact on <u>existing</u> constituencies as the criterion by which to respond to each potential reallocation of juridiction (p.944)."

Holden suggests three major factors which will govern an agency's strategic choice. First, he states that some agencies have a greater disposition to expand than do others. This is most likely in a new organization because, given the need to improve or reform implicit in the formation of many new agencies, there may be present the essential incentive for staff and leadership alike to covet the missions of existing agencies.

In time, of course, as the acquisition of new consituencies co-opts the agency's resources and philosophy, the disposition may shift toward maintenance, and under some circumstances, retrenchment. This last behavior may occur where an agency is dependent on an internal constituency of high skill or one which has substantially inflexible ends (p.946). In that situation, since there is no possibility to balance the demands of constituencies, the administrative politician may employ a strategy of self-limitation.

Second, there are certain occasions for allocation decisions. The situation which often confronts newly established agencies is called "primitive uncertainty (p.947)." It gives the freest play to dispositions to expand.

Third, resolution of inter-agency, jurisdictional disputes is viewed as being highly problematical. Because of the continual inter-mix of agency missions and the phenomena of constituencies "shopping around " for satisfactory organizational response, Holden concludes that tacit bargaining will be the most relevant mode of resolution (p.950).

In the dichotomy presented here (the CAA vs. the LEAs and the SEA), we can see how two kinds of agencies interact with each other: expanding, contracting, and resolving jurisdictional disputes.

Objectives

Given the recent interest in the politics of Title I (ESEA), this study was undertaken:

(1) to explicate and clarify the three conceptual frameworks referred to above,

(2) to specify and illustrate the convergence and complementarity of these three frameworks, and

(3) to apply the three schemes in an integrated fashion to a case study of Title I (ESEA) implementation.

Methods

This paper is an ex post facto case analysis of events which occurred in a community action agency during 1968-1970. The principal author was director of educational services for the community action agency during 1968-69 and had access to the details of agency activities during the following year.

Analysis

Analysis of the data revealed four stages of development in the relationship between the community action agency, on the one hand, and the local educational agencies and the state educational agency, on the other (see Figure 2).

Stage 1

The CAA in this case was a legally stipulated grantee under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, receiving over 90% of its funds from the Federal government through this law. As a community action agency (CAA), it had as its primary role, the establishment of Community Action Programs (CAPs) in the various pockets of poverty that existed in the county.

Stage 1

CAA	LEAs/SEA
Potential Influence -- tentative confidence	Social Control Perspective -- insulation from CAA advice -- LEA autonomy in Head Start
Politics of Expertise -- mutually exclusive expertise -- acknowledged information gap	Politics of Expertise -- broad definition of education excludes CAA from influence
Bureaucratic Imperialism -- primitive uncertainty -- quest for a clear jurisdiction	Bureaucratic Status Quo -- expansion of resources through federal funds without alteration of relationship with CAA

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Stage 2

CAA	LEAs/SEA
Influence Perspective -- deterioration of trust, bordering on alienation	Social Control Perspective -- extreme insulation in communications
Pluralist Politics -- creation of a new constituency of "poor" in LEAs -- use of "sign-off" to induce LEAs to recognize the "poor"	Pluralist Politics -- some compliance with regulations on Title I advisory committees -- but continued rebuffs to CAA's attempt to be spokesman of "poor"
Bureaucratic Imperialism -- dispute over boundary of poverty/education jurisdiction -- CAA staff intrudes on LEA Title I meetings	Bureaucratic Retrenchment -- attempt to define out of LEAs' jurisdiction the "poor" as a separate constituency

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Fig. 2 : The community action agency and educational authority: Stages of development in inter-organizational politics

Stage 3

CAA	LEAs/SEA
Influence Perspective -- collapse of trust in authorities -- strong belief in conspiracy against poor blacks	Social Control Perspective -- recognition of, but limited response to CAA constraints -- attempt to co-opt CAA professional by STA
Status Politics -- confrontation and face-smashing by field staff -- court threat to close down LEA programs -- refusal to "sign-off"	Pluralist Politics -- limited negotiation; attempt at mediation
Bureaucratic Imperialism -- continued attack on exclusivity of LEAs' jurisdiction -- creation of out-reach program	Fading Bureaucratic Status Quo -- new highly visible local constituencies with CAA in supportive role

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Stage 4

CAA	LEAs/SEA
Influence Perspective -- passive alienation -- loss of solidarity	Social Control Perspective -- co-optation of poor parents
Political Passivity -- shift in organizational focus away from education	Pluralist Politics -- LEA Title I advisory committees mandated by SEA
Bureaucratic Retrenchment -- transfer of constituency from CAA leadership to local communities -- defense of CAP programs	Bureaucratic Expansion -- LEAs and SEA recognize expanded jurisdiction at local level

After the early years of community organization a major role of the CAA shifted to emphasize supportive services for the ten local CAPs and to action as advocate of the poor in a variety of areas of need, some not related to the specific objectives of its legislative grant (e.g., CAA representatives provided information, facilities, and time for work on welfare rights, housing, and mental health, even though there was no grant to the CAA in these fields).

In addition, the CAA had responsibility for both full-year and summer Head Start Programs. The 16 summer Head Start Programs included a number which were located in non-CAP communities. Most of the summer Head Start programs, both in CAP communities and non-CAP areas, were contracted for through the local school districts (LEAs), which assumed most of the administrative tasks associated with the program and therefore exercized considerable control over the programs. The CAA, however, still retained a supportive service role and performed limited monitoring and evaluation of these programs, since it was the grantee. Except in the matter of final proposal revision, the CAA deferred to the LEAs in almost all aspects of program development. In fact, social workers and psychologists hired for these programs, although normally associated with community organization activities, were hired by the LEAs and were usually employees of the school districts.

Further, as a result of a provision in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the CAA had an authorized role in the application phase of this act. Section 205, (a)(7) requires:

> that wherever there is, in the area served by the local educational agency, a community action program approved pursuant to Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-452), the programs and projects have been developed in cooperation with the public or private non-profit agency responsible for the community action program; ....

The CAA qualified for this role and was asked to complete a form, provided by the State Education Department (SEA) to the applicant LEAs, signifying that the requirement had been fulfilled. This process occurred once a year for each of 56 LEAs. When the form was signed, it was either forwarded to the LEA to be included in the application package or, if time was short, sent directly to the SEA.

In this regard it is important to note that the only professional staff member who had responsibilities in education, the Head Start director, was funded out of the full-year Head Start grant. Neither the Head Start director nor any other member of the CAA staff had explicit responsibility for reviewing Title I applications. Qualifications for that position stressed community organization and social work training and experience.

The character of the relationship between the CAA and the LEAs was evident from the situation that faced the newly appointed Director of Educational Services[2] in June, 1968. He was confronted with a flood of Title I applications from the LEAs, requiring that he sign a statement attesting to the fact that the CAA had been "consulted " on the needs of low-income children and had participated in the planning of resource allocations. With only one exception, no such consultation and planning had occurred. He was informed by the agency head that the lack of staff expertise

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2. Because the role included more than just Head Start administration, the title "Head Start Director" had been changed to "Director of Educational Services" in 1968.

and the requirements of administering OEO programs prevented a more active role in Title I matters. This attitude was confirmed in a later conversation with the former director. It was apparent that the CAA was in the position of having to trust in the good will and expertise of the educational authorities to serve the best interests of the children. At that time there was no reason nor means for thinking otherwise.

The level of trust, then, was initially rather high between CAA and LEAs. The CAA in Stage 1 had some confidence that the LEAs were the legitimate definers of what education was all about. The means of influence by CAA was confined to persuasion. LEAs believed much more strongly than the CAA that they should be the sole definers of what was an educational question, and who should make decisions about Title I. The LEAs viewed themselves as providing a high quality program for the indigenous poor and typically met CAA requests for pre-programming conferences with indifference.

Important relationships existed between the CAA and the Regional Office of Economic Opportunity and the CAA and the State Office of Economic Opportunity (STA). The Regional Office was the single most important agency in the operation of the CAA, in matters relating to the poverty program. Its staff, in effect, had the power to approve or disapprove the refunding of the agency's grant and made interpretive rulings on guidelines that influenced the operation of the CAA. In matters relating to Title I, however, the Regional Office depended on the State Technical Agency (STA), an OEO agency established to provide the Office of the Governor with a technical basis upon which to base his approval of OEO grants. The STA received its information

about Title I from the State Education Department.

In poverty matters, the STA staff tended to take their cues from the Regional Office, with one exception. In the refunding of Head Start each year, there was an effort on the part of the STA to emphasize the education component over the social aspects of the program. The key education person in the STA was a professional educator whose orientation was shaped by the educational establishment in the state, and whose identification was with the traditional earlychildhood educators.

The inter-agency communication, then, ordinarily had been restricted to the CAA delivering one copy of its total refunding application to the STA each year, confident that the Regional Office would take care of any snags, with the exception of the Head Start proposal. Here, the Head Start Director usually made several modifications after having one or two luncheon conferences with the STA education expert. Although the CAA officials did not realize it for several years, the STA did have the legal authority to intervene in and mediate disputes between the CAA and local school districts.

The Transition to Stage 2

In May 1968, a new CAA Director was recruited, an outspoken, aggressive advocate of the poor. He was to concentrate on poverty programs within CAA while the umbrella-agency head, a soft-spoken, conciliator, spent his time on fund-raising activities.

It was quickly apparent that the CAA stake in Title I program was very great, for the total Title I funds for the county were in excess of the combined poverty program. The question was raised, "With so much at stake, why have Title I 'forms' been signed off so routinely?" The answers were: 1. lack of staff,

2. paucity of important information regarding Title I administration, 3. lack of relationship with school districts, and 4. avoidance by LEAs of submitting to supervision by CAA or CAA-organized groups.

In terms of Stage 1 of the diagram, from the perspective of the CAAs there was pressure to rely on the expertise of the LEAs and SEA and in circumstances were they themselves had little expertise, little knowledge and few relationships with the LEAs and SEA, the CAA was required to pay respect to the school authorities. The CAA was not an expansive organization at that time. Its role was precariously uncertain, but it did not have the resources, nor the knowledge to undertake expansion immediately. It was a new agency looking for jurisdiction and constituencies.

The perspective of the school authorities, LEAs and SEA, was one of great confidence that they, indeed, possessed a monopoly of expertise and service orientation in matters pertaining to the schools, including how decisions about Title I funds should be spent. Little or no advice was accepted from the CAA's on educational matters, and they spent little time in persuading CAA officials of their expertise. Instead they relied heavily upon insulation, giving little information and avoiding relationships with CAA officials where they could.

Stage 2

The transition to Stage 2 occurred rapidly and the level of trust deteriorated quickly through neutrality until it bordered on alienation. But alienation cannot be expressed openly as status politics, nor can direct constraint in relationships

between governmental agencies be applied. Consequently, CAA behavior was characterized by the use of inducements and attempts at administrative restraints, plus the buildup of a legitimate new constituency and the accumulation of information for use as bargaining counters to get the LEAs and the SEA to accept the CAA interpretation of compliance with the law.

There were several events which were important in reducing the level of trust and setting the stage for the style of politics and the turn toward expansion exhibited by the CAA.

The Education Director discovered the existence of a program guide promulgated by the SEA (#46) which called attention to revised criteria for the approval of Title I applications, requiring that there be greater community and parent involvement in the planning, operation and approval of the programs. Based on a memorandum from the U.S. Commissioner of Education, it mandated the establishment of local advisory committees to implement the involvement (USOE, 1968). It suggested

> ... that at least 50 percent of the membership of the committee consist of parents of disadvantaged children attending schools serving the area where projects will be conducted, representatives of the poor from the Community Action Agency and parent members of the Head Start advisory committee, if there is a Head Start project in the community, and representatives of other neighborhood-based organizations which have a particular interest in the compensatory educational program (p.1).

The Education Director found evidence that a wide variety of criteria were being used by the LEAs to establish the number of eligible children who lived in their communities. The Education Director began to question the practices used by several school districts who submitted applications late in August, 1968.

They all claimed to be unable to find the poor in their communities on an up-to-date basis and used eight to ten year old census data or school free lunch lists as measures of eligibility. The Education Director's behavior can be viewed as the the basis for lowered level of confidence in the LEAs and SEA, and as the beginning of real attempts to discredit the professional basis for educational power (the service orientation), and as a prelude to expansion of jurisdiction of the CAA, and restriction of the decision-making autonomy of the LEAs.

From Holden's (1966) point of view, the condition which prevailed during this phase would be characterized as one of primitive uncertainty. He notes that

> ... one critical occasion for making agency claims exists when policies are in their infancy. Doubt and confusion about policy ends lead to similar doubt and confusion about appropriate instruments. There is likely to be an almost primitive uncertainty such that the decision-maker does not 'know what he wants', now how 'to make things turn out right', nor possibly even what 'right' is (p.947).

Up to this point, the CAA had not evidenced a major disposition to expand into the area of education. Although this was about to change, why it had not occurred earlier is a question worth considering.

Under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the major thrust for the county CAA had been the establishment of local CAPs. These had been organized in ten communities which were notable for having pockets of poverty and substantial black populations. This had been a major organizational effort taxing human and financial resources alike. By summer 1967, this task had largely been completed -- witness the fact that the Head Start director appointed that year had formerly been a community organizer and

had not been replaced in the field. By the summer of 1968, then, the CAA was engaged in less community organization and more in providing supportive services and exerting influence at the county level. From an organizational point of view, disposition to expand into a field not normally considered within its purview, was then perhaps a greater possibility and, during the summer Head Start program (1968), an interesting shift in the relations took place. The prior spring, the former Head Start director had hired several social workers and school psychologists for the upcoming summer Head Start program. These people had been designated as CAA personnel in order to allocate their time to the LEA-administered programs on a part-time basis. This was a departure from past practice, when the LEAs had hired their own staff, usually full-time. Ostensibly, budgetary considerations dictated the change but the Head Start director, in a later conversation said that the primary aim of his action had been to stimulate parent involvement in the LEA programs and to give his office (CAA) more control over the programs.

It was then clear that the former director had planned to use the limited resources at his command to induce the LEAs to cooperate more fully in planning, program monitoring, etc.

That the social workers especially, had been trained to organize a new constituency became clear when the then new Education Director received several phone calls from irate LEA summer Head Start administrators demanding to have the social workers withdrawn. Their complaint was particularly revealing since it manifested their past deficiencies in involving the poor parents in the program (an OEO guideline). They claimed that the parents were being "stirred-up" in meetings. The social workers indicated that they merely informed the parents of their rights vis-a-vis

input on selection of the director, classroom activities, field trips, etc. One LEA went as far as to assert that it would be the judge of what was appropriate parent involvement, not the CAA social workers; it threatened to terminate the program at the end of the summer if the social worker returned.

Clearly then, early interaction with local educational authorities indicated their unwillingness to expand the definition of educational expertise to include non-traditional sources. Further, experience indicated that where they could, the LEAs and SEA excluded the CAA from the normal flow of information to harden jurisdictional boundaries, and while they welcomed additional funds they were unwilling to recognize the new constituency (poor children) upon which these funds were based. The negative emotional impact on agency field staff of the refusal of certain LEAs to permit CAA social workers to meet with poor parents had been profound. It not only lowered the level of confidence of the CAA staff in the LEAs, but was the basis for a great increase in solidarity among the social workers, parents, and spurred a strong, non-trusting behavior on the part of the CAA generally. The CAA and parents groups that had been organized moved quickly from tentative confidence to antagonistic neutrality. That is, they were still willing to go through channels, i.e., to use the regular governmental processes to influence the LEAs and SEA.

Having entered into a new trust relationship with the LEAs, the CAA mounted a campaign to get the LEA and SEA to comply with their concepts of legitimate behavior regarding Title I. This process also created the basis for expansion of the CAA. First, the CAA Director recruited a social worker intern from Fordham to devote his time exclusively to Title I. Secondly, strenuous

attempts were made to gather all the pertinent documents on Title I to be used as inducements to have the LEAs and SEA comply. Soon, telephone calls were made to all agencies that might have information on Title I. Gradually, useful material began to arrive but not without the Education Director having to send a strong letter to the U.S. Commissioner of Education which, in turn, drew an outraged response (and much material) from the SEA. However, it was not until June, 1969, until the CAA had built an adequate file of essential Title I documents.

Notwithstanding the inadequate information on hand, however, when the intern arrived in late September, 1968, objectives were quickly decided upon and action begun. It was concluded that, since the CAA was on firm footing (Pgm. Guide #46), the matter of Title I advisory committees would be pressed quite vigorously.

During late 1968 and early 1969, knowing that the LEAs did not have to submit applications until the next summer, the CAA decided to gradually escalate the pressure during the year. Accordingly, beginning in early November, 1968, a series of memoranda were sent by the CAA to all 56 LEAs in Nassau County, informing them of the requirement for Title I advisory committees, and requesting detailed information on the composition and functions of the committees. In all memos and a number of follow-up telephone calls made in the late Winter, 1969, the information requested was characterized as being necessary for the CAA to indicate its "approval" on the Statement by Community Action Agency submitted to the agency. Also, in the memos and in all conversations, the CAA offered its assistance in the formation of the committees in the LEAs, specifically with regard to the recruitment of disadvantaged parents.

At this juncture, the CAA can be viewed as using the leverage of "sign-off" to induce cooperation on the part of the LEAs. The CAA no longer trusted the LEAs to look after the interests of the poor community -- evidence had been too much to the contrary. The mood now was that of trying to achieve a quid pro quo of active CAA participation by the threat of withholding a legal resource (i.e., sign-off) and offering to assist the LEAs in achieving compliance with the requirement for Title I advisory committees.

In this effort the Title I Coordinator in his numerous visits to public school meetings identified himself as the "representative of the poor", much to the dismay of LEA professionals; for here was a CAA representative attempting to assume as his own, a constituency important to both the CAA and the LEAs. During this period, the CAA had a number of informal communications that indicated that some LEAs were setting up advisory committees. They continued to decline to respond CAA requests for information and consultation, however.

In March, 1969, the CAA found out that there was going to be a supplementary allocation of funds to the districts and the CAA Director sent a letter to the SEA requesting the procedures whereby the CAA could express its approval for the additional programs developed in light of the increased funding. In the exchange of letters that followed, the CAA was never told how to proceed and indications were that the LEAs would be allocated the additional funds withouth necessarily having to submit project amendments.

Whereas in Stage 2 the CAA attempts to influence the LEAs and SEA were escalated and inducements and constraints were used whenever possible, of particular interest is the fact that the CAA began to build a repertoire of tools with which to influence

the LEAs, particularly. The assignment of a person full-time to Title I who was not a professional educator but was a professional nevertheless, a social worker, meant increased vigor in pushing the CAA view and ensured that that view would be quite different from the professional educators'. This social worker (intern) was given the title "Title I Coordinator", one which was identical to that found in many LEAs.

The need to cut down the autonomy of the LEAs in defining how Title I was to be implemented required the collection of documents on Title I which might give legitimacy to CAA view as opposed to the LEAs and SEA.

With aggressive attempts to become engaged in influencing the LEAs and SEA, the CAA began exhibiting the attributes of an expansive bureaucracy also. It sought to build a new constituency, the poor, to create a jurisdiction for itself that included what had traditionally been in the schools' domain. The CAA attempted to include as a part of the educational domain some notions that had previously been associated with welfare and social work.

The level of trust was decidedly lowered by the LEAs' consistent attempts to leave CAA (and poor parents) out of the decision-making process and out of the communications channels between LEA, SEA and OEO. The LEA and SEA, first tried insulation as a means of coping with the CAA. Then, they tried, to some extent, to defend themselves by retrenchment, i.e., trying to define out of their jurisdiction what they thought were welfare problems.

Stage 3

In Stage 3, the escalation of aggressive action against the LEAs and SEA continued. However, Stage 3 did not go so far as to

include much behavior by CAA personnel that is ordinarily associated with alienation and status politics. That is, alienation was there and status politics was close to the surface. However, the actual confrontations, breaking up of meetings, and so on occurred rarely, and then only outside the official auspices of the CAA. Thus, Stage 3 was mixed, pluralist politics and status politics, various levels of alienation and neutrality, some confrontations but much more behavior associated with neutrality, i.e., attempts to influence by going through the appropriate channels, and perhaps unofficially negotiating and compromising.

The crucial event in the shift into Stage 3 emerged when the CAA became aware of plans being made by the LEAs to hold a bi-county Title I conference in May, 1969. A letter was sent to the chairman of the conference (a coordinator of federal programs who had been the LEA administrator for one of the Summer Head Start Programs), requesting that the CAA be involved in the planning process. When no reply was received, the CAA Director, Education Director and Title I Coordinator jointly decided that strong action be taken.

Consequently, on the opening day of the conference, the CAA Title I Coordinator and several poor (and black) parents from different communities in Nassau County disrupted the proceedings by engaging in an extended and vituperative accusation of all present, to the effect that the poor and black people of the county were being deprived of monies rightfully theirs. From the reactions of several of the administrators with whom the Education Director had begun to develop good rapport, the demonstration had a great negative emotional impact on many of the professional educators present. Following this, the CAA held a meeting with the ten local CAP directors in an attempt to activate them toward

a more vigorous role in establishing advisory committees in their districts. Similar to CAA behavior during Stage 1, due to a lack of technical expertise the CAPs had continued to routinely "sign-off" Title I applications submitted by LEAs in their communities. The meeting, therefore, was quite an organizational success since it helped the CAP directors to focus on the advisory committees as a legitimate issue for them to pursue and gave them assurance that the CAA would provide the necessary expertise should a showdown come with the LEAs.

Particularly important to note here is the intra-organizational tension that had developed between the CAA professionals and the largely paraprofessional field staff. The constraints on policy that an internal constituency can place upon an organization have been noted by Holden (1966); especially where there is a high ideological conponent to employee commitment, in order for an administrative politician to achieve "... suitable combinations of means and ends to yield effective incentives for the constituents he desires (p. 944)," he may have to initiate courses of action that are unpredictable to extra-organizational observers.[3]

The CAA professional staff had increasingly been criticized (then accused) by the field staff of "playing games" with the establishment. Negotiating was to them a "sell-out" and when the Executive Director was ignored by the SEA in his attempt to have the CAA participate in the bi-county planning conference the threshold point had been reached.

The use of status politics at the May, 1969 conference, (i.e., shouting down speakers, accusations of malfeasance and racism) could have been curtailed by the Executive Director only

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3. For an account of the OEO program in Washington, D.C. utilizing similar concepts, see Wolman, 1972.

at the risk of substantial loss of authority with the staff. That it yielded immediate organizational benefits with the local CAPs, seen in increased solidarity, was important for an agency rapidly moving toward a service posture in some communities.

That this tactic marked the beginning a mixed, third stage can be attested to by the fact that when a representative from the STA offered to mediate the now highly visible controversy between the CAA on the one hand and the SEA and LEAs on the other, he was refused by the CAA. The alienation had become so pervasive that when an invitation to the Education Director to have luncheon with the STA representative was proferred, he was prohibited by the Executive Director from accepting.

During the early summer a major strategy session on Title I was held in the CAA. Although most of the districts had complied with the requirement of the advisory committee on paper, for several reasons this approach was viewed as being of limited value. First, although the committees were mandated, the percentage of parents of disadvantaged children was only "suggested" to be 50%; it was too easy for an LEA to arrange committee membership to nullify the effects of poverty group membership. Second, another program guide on the matter had come to light, which permitted arrangements other than the advisory committee to serve the interests of community involvement in Title I, e.g., public meetings and existing committees would also be considered for this function.

Addressed to the SEA from the Commissioner of Education, the final paragraph of this memo stated:

> Whatever arrangement is decided upon, it should be one which your office, in the light of its understanding of the local situation, finds likely to be effective in increasing community

and parent participation in Title I programs for impoverished children (USOE, 1968 b, p. 1).

Third, as a result of much discussion among CAA staff and a number of political, community, and media leaders during the year, the consensus was that the issues of monetary allocation and expenditure were likely to bear greater results if pursued vigorously.

Inasmuch as the Title I Coordinator and the Director had been raising the matters of eligibility and the degree to which the compensatory programs were being designed for poor children in all their discussions with LEA administrators, with little in the way of satisfactory response (i.e., the use of the ADC list was rare and LEAs continued to maintain that as long as children were educationally disadvantaged, there was no requirement to give poor children priority in recruitment into the programs), it was decided that a legal confrontation was necessary.

Specifically two thrusts were employed: one, an attack on the allocation of funds to districts with few poor children and the other, a demand that schools gear their programs toward specific educational compensatory efforts for poor children.

Accordingly, when the public school systems of two LEAs (Levittown and Garden City) submitted their Title I applications to the CAA, the "Statement by Community Action Agency" was not signed by the CAA Director, nor was the form sent to the SEA. In the case of both districts, the CAA Director called upon the SEA to investigate the use of Title I funds which he charged, were not being used to assist poor children but were being used to "...supplement ...." the school budgets (Newsday, 1969 a). In his statement, the CAA Director several times said that the agency had "rejected" the LEAs applications. The assistand commissioner for the SEA in charge of Title I replied that

> The law doesn't require approval from the OEO ... but when we get the letter we will investigate to find out exactly what the problem is and whether the allegations are correct and how the problem can be resolved (p. 3).

On the next day, he expanded this comment by adding that the filing of Title I applications with the CAA was a procedure to insure that programs between the schools and the OEO did not overlap (Newsday, 1969 b).

Another reply to the charge of fund abuse came from the superintendent of schools in Levittown:

> The program is being criticized by people incapable of recognizing a good program; it is an attempt to turn Title I into a welfare program (Levittown Tribune, 1969, p. 1).

Subsequently, the CAA Director met with the assistant commissioner in Albany and reported afterwards that the SEA had agreed to set up a statewide advisory committee to determine a new definition for the term "educational disadvantage" in deciding eligibility for Title I funds. He also said that he hoped to set up a meeting with Senators Goodel and Javits and the Long Island Congressional delegation to "... get at the root of the problem -- that the law does not unequivocally state that the monies are to be used for poor children (Newsday, 1969 c)."

On October 2nd, the assistant commissioner issued a finding that the Levittown Title I program was "... being operated in compliance with federal and state guidelines ..." but ordered that the program be modified to give "... more priority for services for schools with the largest number of poverty level students (Newsday, 1969 d).

At the same time that the controversy over the Levittown program was taking place, the CAA had called for an investigation of the situation in Garden City. The charge here was that LEA

had in fact only one child on the ADC list and, therefore, the district did not qualify for a Title I allocation under the SEA's regulations. The assistant director for federally aided programs (SEA) stated "... that some well-to-do districts such as Garden city may have been given portions of the state's share of Title I funds without proving that they had poor children. (Newsday, 1969 e, p. 7)." But he attributed this to a complicated formula combining poverty figures from both the 1960 census and current ADC lists and the necessity of calculating pro rata shares for situations where political sub-division boundaries are not contiguous with school districts. He also stressed the fact that the state had altered its formula to emphasize current statistics more and the 1960 census less.

The CAA began to influence key persons and agencies to as great extent as possible, during late 1969 and early 1970. The Title I Coordinator spoke to a member of the committee appointed by Commissioner of Education Allen and provided him with data demonstrating the disparity in Title I aid to children in rich and poor districts as a consequence of SEA policies (Long Island Press, 1969). The CAA provided data and assistance to Assembly Majority Leader John Kingston in the preparation of a bill to revise the Title I formula along ADC lines (Newsday, 1970 a). Although providing state funds to rich districts during its first year in order to allow for a gradual end to their programs, the bill was voted down in the State Senate, after having passed in the Assembly.

According to one report, the visibility given to the issue of Title I allocations and the pressure on the SEA by the majority leaders office led to an uncharacteristic policy disagreement

within the SEA. Newsday (1970 b) commented:

> It is believed that one of Nyquist's (State Commissioner of Education) assistants, Irving Ratchick (Title I Coordinator), overruled several Title I specialists in the department in yesterday's reported refusal to alter the formula [p. 17].

Other evidence of CAA influence in the political arena emerged when the Title I Coordinator was invited to make a statement to the House Committee on Education and Labor regarding "inequities" in Title I. Further, as a result of considerable effort on the part of the CAA staff, Representative John Wydler filed a bill to amend ESEA so that every time the phrase "educationally deprived children" appeared in the Act, the words "from low-income families" would follow it (U.S. Congress, 1970). Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the amendments did not pass and the pertinent definitions remained unchanged.

During the period May, 1969 - late Spring, 1970 it is interesting to note a mix of political style. While much of the field staff activity and some of the court action was imbued with moral rectitude and face-smashing, other efforts by CAA professional staff with local legislators were pluralistic. It was a balance which gained the benefit of continued visibility of LEA and SEA "duplicity" ("rich communities getting Title I allocations"), thereby satisfying the demands of an internal constituency and at the same time providing the political environment with evidence that a negotiated settlement or trade-off was the goal of the executive staff.

In local organization particularly, the use of status politics had borne fruit. As a consequence of the more militant mood in the CAA during 1969-1970, several Summer Head Start units had organized vigorous parents advisory committees. These had usually been only paper organizations, at most providing PTA-type support

for LEA program administration. As an outgrowth of the organization of one of these parent groups, the basis of an outreach program was formed. This program, presently serving the poor white in a largely middle class area, could not have been developed without the successful challenge to one Head Start director, resulting in his replacement by a man preferred by the parents.

One should note, that with all the heat that was generated, major change in Title I practices in Nassau County were not affected. Of course, Title I advisory committees existed in all districts by 1970, but parents of poor children were a minimal factor in all but about 18; the SEA regreted the inequity produced by its formula but will not have completely changed over to an ADC based-calculation until this year ; and, of course, the Wydler and Kingston bills did not become law.

Was then, the CAA successful? Gamson (1968) speaks to this question in his discussion of the mobilization of resources.

> If "success" is judged in terms of immediate influence, such claims might appear to rely on a false coin -- a confusion of public attention with actual influence on policy. However, if success is judged in terms of building organizational support and tapping potential resources, the coin may be quite real (p. 99).

Using this criteria, the efforts of the Nassau County CAA to change Title I practices yielded enormous organizational benefits. The resources utilized in the controversy were either underdeveloped as in the case of Head Start parents or completely new as in the cases of the full-time Title I Coordinator the strengthened relationship with key legislators, and the utilization of court action to enforce regulations

Moreover, when compared to the efforts of community action agencies elsewhere to have an impact in the area of parent advisory

committees, the Nassau County CAA did well; according to one account in the New York Times (1970), the requirement for advisory committees was still widely ignored in 1970 and was just then beginning to be enforced.

Stage 4

Although it is difficult to be sure, some of the "success" of the CAA may have led to another stage in relationships. It is difficult to be definitive because by early Fall, 1970 several key staff had taken positions elsewhere and the events of the next two years may have been influences by that.

Nevertheless, by the summer of 1970, a number of black, poor parents had been appointed as members of Title I advisory committees. Further, actual delineation of committee memberships and meeting dates was to become required by the SEA as part of Title I applications. Two of the paraprafessional field staff of CAA became actively involved on the Title I committees in their respective committees; CAP directors became more actively aware of the content of Title I programs in their districts; and, the level of CAA activity in Title I matters dropped off sharply. The CAA had the resources to replace the then (Fall, 1970) departed Title I Coordinator - it did not do so. Whether this was due to the success to that date or whether other organizational concerns were crucial is interesting to consider.

It might well be that the ideological ferver of the field staff had been sufficiently co-opted by their participation on Title I committees and that the loss of solidarity led to a shift in organizational focus. Further, the capacity of black people to negotiate at that point perhaps raised the level of trust to one which no longer made status politics tenable. And, at least as important,

the rising attacks on OEO by the Congress and others led the CAA to reassert its energy toward a defense of its frontlines -- the local CAPs. This CAA retrenchment is understandable in light of the cooptation by the LEAs of poor blacks onto local Title I advisory committees and when it is recalled that the primary constituency of the CAA continued to be the poor in the ten OEO target areas — for it was this organizational effort which justified its legislative grant.

Conclusion

Analysis of the data revealed four stages of development in the relationship between the community action agency (CAA), on the one hand, and the local educational agencies (LEAs) and state educational agency (SEA), on the other. It was found that the CAA's behavior was best understood utilizing the influence perspective and that the level of agency alienation was associated with manifest shifts in political style across the four phases. Moreover, the CAA's attempt to expand its jurisdiction fit Holden's model of bureaucratic imperialism.

In the face of CAA attempts to exert influence in Title I matters, the LEAs and the SEA engaged in behaviors characteristic of a social control perspective throughout all four stages. There was a sustained effort on the part of the educational authorities to insulate their organizations from CAA influence and to define jurisdictions narrowly. Here too there was a shift in political style, although to a lesser extent than with the CAA; in the first stage the authorities acted as the experts -- then gradually assumed a more pluralist posture over the next three stages.

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